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INTRODUCTION 
Litigation is a breeding ground for misconduct by lawyers and those 
they represent. 1 In cases of misconduct, courts have several options for 
sanctioning lawyers and litigants. For example, courts may invoke their 
inherent powers to sanction lawyers and parties who act in bad faith. 2 Courts 
* Managing Director, Professional Services Group, Aon Risk Services, Chicago, 
Illinois. J.D., University of Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; B.S., Fort Hays State 
University. Opinions expressed here are the author's alone. 
1. This unfortunate reality is to some extent understandable. Litigation can gener-
ate strong emotions on the part oflawyers and clients and, accordingly, taint their behaviors. 
The high stakes in some cases animate misjudgments by lawyers and parties alike. The dead-
lines, time pressures, and evidentiary and procedural rules that characterize litigation test 
lawyers' competence, diligence, and judgment in ways that other practice areas generally do 
not. 
2. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (discussing inherent 
powers of federal district courts); Barrett v. Jones, Funderburg, Sessums, Peterson & Lee, 
LLC, 27 So. 3d 363, 370 (Miss. 2009) ("A court has the inherent power to impose sanctions 
in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process."); Emerson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 
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may invoke their inherent powers to sanction even when misconduct is not 
expressly covered by a rule or statute.3 Although sanctions imposed under 
courts' inherent powers must be reasonably proportionate to the miscon-
duct,4 in extreme circumstances this power includes the discretion to dismiss 
a case.5 Of course, courts may impose sanctions under rules of civil proce-
dure and statutes.6 The best known of these rules is Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, which applies to pleadings, motions, and other documents 
filed with federal courts and, when focused on representations to a court, 
permits the court to "impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law 
firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation."7 
Many states have analogous rules. The most prominent statute is 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, which states in pertinent part: "An attorney ... who so multiplies 
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required 
by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' 
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."8 
It is understandable that a party that engages in bad faith conduct in 
litigation may be sanctioned by a court.9 It is also logical that where a law-
Court of State, 263 P.3d 224, 229 (Nev. 2011) (stating that trial courts "have broad discretion 
to impose sanctions for professional misconduct at trial"); Kelly v. Kelly, 806 N.W.2d 133, 
145 (N.D. 2011) ("A district court also has inherent authority to sanction a litigant for mis-
conduct."). The scope of courts' inherent authority varies between jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Vidrio v. Hernandez, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 186 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that California trial 
courts' inherent powers do not include imposing monetary sanctions). 
3. Town of Stratford v. Castater, 46 A.3d 953, 956 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (quoting 
Hirschfeld v. Machinist, 27 A.3d 395, 398 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)); In reMarriage ofWilson, 
223 P.3d 815, 822 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010); Emerson, 263 P.3d at 229; Ezeoke v. Tracy, 349 
S.W.3d 679, 685 (Tex. App. 2011). 
4. See Weinberg v. Dickson-Weinberg, 229 P.3d 1133, 1142 (Haw. 2010); Emer-
son, 263 P.3d at 230 (citing Heinle v. Heinle, 777 N.W.2d 590, 602 (N.D. 2010)); Kelly, 806 
N.W.2d at 145 (citing Dronen v. Dronen, 764 N.W.2d 675, 693 (N.D. 2009)). 
5. Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Montano v. City of Chicago, 535 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
6. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE§ 
1, at 1-1 to -3 (4th ed. 2008) (identifying federal rules which support sanctions). 
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(l) (referring to violations of Rule 11(b)). 
8. 28 U.S. C. § 1927 (2006). The showing of bad faith necessary to impose sanc-
tions under§ 1927 is similar to that required to invoke the court's inherent power to sanction. 
Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Oliveri v. Thomp-
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986)). The essential difference between sanctions im-
posed by a court pursuant to its inherent authority and those issued under § 1927 is that sanc-
tions under§ 1927 may be imposed only against lawyers, while sanctions based on a court's 
inherent authority may be imposed against lawyers, parties, or both. !d. at 144 (citing Oliveri, 
803 F.2d at 1273). 
9. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grafman, 274 F.R.D. 442, 445-52 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (entering default judgment against defendants for serious misconduct in 
discovery, including spoliation of evidence); Kraft v. High Country Motors, Inc., 2012 MT 
83, ~~ 28-39, 364 Mont. 465, 276 P.3d 908, 914-15 (affirming entry of default judgment 
against defendants for discovery violations). 
Sanctioning Clients for Lawyers' Misconduct 837 
yer and the lawyer's client are guilty of coordinated litigation misconduct, 
the court may sanction them both and either hold them liable jointly and 
severally, or allocate or apportion sanctions between them. 10 But what of the 
situation where the lawyer alone commits misconduct and the court visits 
the lawyer's sins on the innocent client when awarding sanctions, as per-
haps by striking the client's pleadings, precluding the introduction of evi-
dence or testimony favorable to the client, fining the client, or even dismiss-
ing the client's case with prejudice? In a tragic Illinois product liability case, 
for example, the court struck the defendant manufacturer's pleadings-a so-
called "death penalty" sanction-as punishment for the defense lawyers' 
serious misconduct in discovery. 11 Stripped of its liability defenses, the de-
fendant settled with the plaintiffs for an estimated $15 million. 12 
In a North Carolina case, lawyers representing both a corporate de-
fendant, Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., and an individual defendant, Don-
ald Pottner, secretly spirited Pottner out-of-state during trial to avoid further 
damaging testimony by him and lied to the court in an unsuccessful effort to 
conceal their ploy. 13 Basically, they told the court that Pottner had become 
catastrophically ill overnight and was thus unavailable to testify. 14 If Pottner 
was sick at all, his condition was not serious and he clearly could have re-
turned to court to finish testifying. 15 The defense lawyers' ruse was appar-
ently exposed when the plaintiffs' lawyer obtained Pottner's medical rec-
10. See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass'n, v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l 
Union, No. 00 Civ. 3613(LAP), 2004 WL 1943099, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004) (find-
ing that joint and several liability was appropriate because "the sanctionable conduct [was] a 
'coordinated effort' of counsel and party") (quoting Estate of Calloway v. Marvel Entm't 
Grp., 9 F.3d 237, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1993)); N. Va. Real Estate, Inc. v. Martins, 720 S.E.2d 
121, 135-36 (Va. 2012) (affirming sanctions against lawyer and client jointly where client 
participated in misconduct); Boyce v. Pruitt, 80 Va. Cir. 590, 604 (2010) (finding that both 
lawyer and client should be sanctioned because their misconduct was "a coordinated effort"). 
II. Heather Cole, Judge Orders 'Death Penalty' Sanctions Against St. Louis Law 
Firm Sandberg Phoenix, Mo. LAW. MEDIA (Nov. 14, 2011), http://law-joumals-
books.vlex.com/vid/orders-sanctions-louis-sandberg-phoenix-
335996094?ix _resultado= l.O&query[buscable _id]=4694&query[buscable _type ]=Fuente&qu 
ery[ filters_ order ]=source&query[ q]= Judge+Orders+%E2%80%98Death+Penalty%E2%80% 
99+Sanctions+ Against+St. +Louis+. 
12. /d.; Heather Cole, Insurers Sue St. Louis-Based Sandberg Phoenix for Malprac-
tice, Mo. LAW. MEDIA (May 7, 2012), http://law-joumals-books.vlex.com/vid/insurers-
sandberg-phoenix-malpractice-372900698 (reporting that the two insurance companies that 
paid the settlement on behalf of the manufacturer later sued the two allegedly responsible 
defense lawyers and their law firm for legal malpractice). 
13. Brockington v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., Inc., No. 09 CVS 2330, 1-6 (Gen. Ct. of 
Justice, Johnston Cnty., N.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (on file with the author), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/uploads/file/Brockington%20v%20Jacobs%20En 
g%20Docs.pdf. 
14. Id. at 2-6. 
15. /d. at 6. 
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ords and alerted the court. 16 Because Pottner and Jacobs shared counsel and 
were "united in interest," the court struck Jacobs' answer as well as 
Pottner's answer, and ordered the trial to proceed solely on the issue of 
damages. 17 
In a Midwestern case, 18 the plaintiffs alleged that a defense lawyer's 
dishonesty in discovery and breaches of his duty of candor to the trial court 
when arguing before it were grounds for punitive damages against the law-
yer's corporate client. The court's embrace of this theory and related rulings 
powered the defendant's decision to settle. 
With the partial exception of the North Carolina case, there was no ev-
idence of the clients' complicity in the lawyers' alleged misconduct in any 
of these cases. 19 The courts nonetheless sanctioned the clients. 
Courts and others who seek to hold parties liable for their lawyers' 
misconduct often deploy agency law as a basis for doing so.20 This is a su-
perficially appealing approach. The attorney-client relationship is an agency 
relationship, with the client cast as the principal and the lawyer as the 
agent.21 It is a general rule of agency law that a principal is bound by its 
agent's acts when the agent is acting with actual or apparent authority or 
when the principal ratifies the agent's acts.22 Thus, a Connecticut court held 
that a defendant could be held liable for violating the Connecticut Unfair 
Trade Practices Act based on its lawyer's conduct during negotiations to sell 
land.23 Because the lawyer was acting within the scope of his authority at 
16. See id. at 5 (reciting the plaintiff's request to review Portner's medical records). 
17. /d. at 9. 
18. My knowledge of this unreported case comes from my involvement as an expert 
witness for the defense. 
19. In the North Carolina case, Jacobs had a representative at trial, but it appears that 
while he knew Portner was supposedly ill, he did not know Portner's true condition. See id. 
20. See, e.g., Gripe v. City of Enid, Oklahoma, 312 F.3d 1184, 1189 (lOth Cir. 
2002) ("Plaintiff argues against the harshness of penalizing him for his attorney's conduct. 
But there is nothing novel here. Those who act through agents are customarily bound by their 
agents' mistakes. It is no different when the agent is an attorney."); Everyday Learning Corp. 
v. Larson, 242 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that "this court follows the 'well-
established principle that a party is responsible for the actions and conduct of his [or her] 
counsel"') (alteration in original) (quoting Boogaerts v. Bank of Bradley, 961 F.2d 765, 768 
(8th Cir. 1992)); Mendoza v. McDonald's Corp., 213 P.3d 288, 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) 
(allowing punitive damages against an insurer for the conduct of its lawyers based on the 
lawyers' status as the insurer's agents); Peterson v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 753 S.W.2d 
278, 280 (Ark. 1988) (applying agency law in holding client liable for abuse of process based 
on attorney's actions). 
21. Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B.V., 218 P.3d 1150, 1170 (Idaho 2009); In re 
Marriage of Stephenson, 955 N.E.2d 618, 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Spees v. Ky. Legal Aid, 
274 S.W.3d 447, 448 (Ky. 2009); Thomas & Thomas Court Reporters, L.L.C. v. Switzer, 
810 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Neb. 2012). 
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§§ 2.01, 2.03, 4.01 (2007). 
23. Landmark lnv. Grp., LLC v. Chung Family Realty P'ship, LLC, 10 A.3d 61, 81 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2010). 
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the time of the conduct at issue, his actions could be imputed to the defend-
ant for purposes of establishing a CUTPA violation.24 Similarly, a Texas 
court held that two plaintiffs were bound by a settlement agreement their 
lawyer signed while he represented them, notwithstanding their later pro-
tests that the agreement was invalid. 25 Closer to the immediate point, an 
Indiana court relied on agency law in holding that a guarantor was not enti-
tled to post-judgment relief based on his lawyer's failure to raise as a de-
fense the alleged forgery of the guarantor's signature on the guaranty.26 The 
court rejected the guarantor's argument that his lawyer's neglect should not 
be attributed to him as running contrary to Indiana's "longstanding rule that 
a client is bound by his attorney's actions.'m 
Yet agency law is not an entirely satisfying basis for imputing a law-
yer's misconduct to a client in the sanctions context.28 The hallmark of an 
agency relationship is the agent's ability when acting with appropriate au-
thority to bind the principal contractually.29 That understanding explains, for 
example, the foregoing Connecticut and Texas decisions.30 In contrast, prin-
cipals are not ordinarily liable for their agents' torts.31 Vicarious liability 
typically requires a master-servant relationship between the defendant and 
the tortfeasor.32 This requirement is central to the well-known respondeat 
superior doctrine.33 Respondeat superior liability premised on a master-
servant relationship is analogous to the situation in which a court imputes a 
24. !d. 
25. Green v. Midland Mortg. Co., 342 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex. App. 2011). 
26. Weinreb v. TR Developers, LLC, 943 N.E.2d 856, 866-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
27. !d. at 867. 
28. See generally Adam Liptak, Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients for 
Their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 110 MICH. L. REv. 875, 875 (20I2) (observing that "clients and 
lawyers fit the agency model imperfectly"); William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory 
of the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Respon-
sible for Their Attorneys' Procedural Errors, I988 DUKE L.J. 733, 742-53 (arguing that 
agency theory is inconsistent with the policy considerations that support the dismissal of 
cases for lack of prosecution and discovery abuse). 
29. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP§ 49, at II3 (3d 
ed. 200 I) (describing this as "the really distinguishing characteristic of the agent"). 
30. The decision in the Indiana case is explained by the agency law concept of in-
herent authority. See Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d I299, 130I (Ind. I998) (ex-
plaining that a client's retention of a lawyer equips the lawyer with "the inherent power to 
bind [the] client to the results of a procedure in court"). 
31. Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 632, 640 (E.D. La. 
2009) (interpreting Louisiana law); Vaughn v. First Transit, Inc., 206 P.3d I81, I87 (Or. 
2009); GREGORY, supra note 29, § 49, at 113-14. 
32. Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co. v. 100 Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 36 A.3d 985, 1003 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 20I2); Rasmussen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 201I WI 52,~ 26, 335 Wis. 2d I, 
803 N.W.2d 623; GREGORY, supra note 29, §52, at II8. 
33. See Macaluso v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 2010-I478, p. 5-6 (La. App. I Cir. 
2/23/11); 59 So. 3d 454 (equating vicarious liability with the respondeat superior doctrine). 
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lawyer's misconduct to the lawyer's faultless client for the purpose of im-
posing sanctions.34 
But while principal-agent and master-servant relationships may over-
lap, they are not interchangeable. All masters are principals and all servants 
are agents, but not all principals are masters, nor are all agents servants.35 As 
a rule, lawyers are not their clients' servants even though they are their 
agents. Rather, lawyers generally are independent contractors in relation to 
their clients.36 Here, then, courts' reliance on agency law to penalize clients 
for their lawyers' misconduct begins to falter. 37 Even shifting from vicarious 
liability based on respondeat superior to liability premised on the agency 
law doctrine of apparent authority, which does not require a master-servant 
relationship and therefore applies to independent contractors, is no answer.38 
However broad a lawyer's apparent authority to act for a client may be, it is 
prudently limited to activities that are legal and proper;39 it generally should 
not be held to encompass the types of misconduct for which sanctions will 
lie.40 
Courts' imprecise use of the term "agent" and related misconceptions 
may be the most apparent flaws in this aspect of sanctions law, but they are 
not the only ones. There is also the fundamental problem that sanctioning 
innocent parties for lawyers' misconduct is frequently unfair and is unlikely 
34. See Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76 (Tex. App. 1994). 
35. Vaughn, 206 P.3d at 187 (citing Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 385 P.2d 611, 612 
(Or. 1963)); GREGORY, supra note 29, § 2, at 4-5. 
36. Ingersoll-Rand Equip. Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 963 F. Supp. 452, 455 (M.D. 
Pa. 1997) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
37. Cf Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda, Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368 (Ct. App. 1987) 
("While much of what an attorney does in litigation is contractually binding on the client ... 
where it is tortious the client is not vicariously liable merely for retaining the attorney who is 
an independent contractor."). 
38. An Indiana court avoided the independent contractor barrier to vicarious liability 
by holding that the uniqueness of the attorney client relationship made both the absence .of a 
master-servant relationship and independent contractor doctrine irrelevant to the issue of a 
client's liability for its lawyer's conduct so long as the lawyer was acting within the scope of 
his authority. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Groen, 486 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1985). It is not clear from the Groen decision, however, whether the lawyer's conduct 
was wrongful such that it ought not to have been deemed to be authorized by the client. See 
id. at 572. Nor does it appear that the client made that argument. See id. 
39. Phx. Ins. Co. v. Terrazzano, No. 34 15 39, 1993 WL 104423, at *2 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Mar. 25, 1993) (citing Allen v. Nissley, 440 A.2d 231, 234 (Conn. 1981)); Plant v. 
Trust Co. of Columbus, 310 S.E.2d 745,747 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
40. See Allen, 440 A.2d at 234 (explaining that the general rule that a lawyer's acts 
are imputed to the client may yield "to the special circumstances of a case," such as when 
"an attorney acts in bad faith or intentionally neglects the client's business"); Terrazzano, 
1993 WL I 04423, at *2 (stating that "where an attorney acts in bad faith, without the 
knowledge of his or her client, such acts should not be imputed to the client"). 
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to remedy the misconduct or to deter similar misbehavior in the future. To 
be effective, sanctions should be personal to the offender.41 
In summary, clients should be sanctioned for or in connection with 
their lawyers' misconduct in only two situations. The ftrst is where the cli-
ent is complicit in the lawyer's misconduct. Courts that sanction clients in 
this situation often describe a "coordinated effort" or a "concerted effort" 
between the lawyer and the client.42 The second is where a sanction will be 
meaningful only if it affects the client, or it is impossible to remedy the 
lawyer's misconduct without sanctioning the client. For example, a lawyer's 
misconduct at trial may necessitate sanctions affecting the client even 
though the client did not influence the lawyer's decisions or tactics because 
any other approach would not alleviate the harm suffered by other parties or 
cure any prejudice to the court. Moreover, sanctioning a client for its law-
yer's misconduct at trial is consistent with the general rule that both clients 
and lawyers are bound by trial strategy. This Article advocates courts' adop-
tion of these two approaches to sanctions based on agency law and equitable 
principles. 
I. AGENCY LAW AS A BASIS FOR SANCTIONING CLIENTS FOR LA WYERS' 
MISCONDUCT 
The persistent assumption that agency law provides a proper basis for 
sanctioning parties for their counsel's misconduct traces back to the Su-
preme Court's 1962 decision in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. 43 In Link, the 
Court concluded that a district court acting on its inherent authority to 
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases had the discretion 
to dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute without giving notice of its 
intention to do so or providing an adversary hearing before acting.44 The 
district court in Link dismissed the case after plaintiff William Link's law-
yer chose not to attend a pretrial conference because he thought it more im-
portant to remain in his office to work on another case for a different cli-
ent.45 Link protested that under the circumstances, the dismissal of his case 
41. Estep v. Kasparian, 607 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); TransAmerican 
Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913,917 (Tex. 1991). 
42. See, e.g., Estate of Calloway v. Marvel Entm't Grp., 9 F.3d 237, 239 (2d Cir. 
1993) (imposing joint and several liability for sanctions where the Rule II violation was "a 
coordinated effort" between the party and counsel); Velocity Micro, Inc. v. Edge Interactive 
Media, Inc., No. 3:08cv135, 2008 WL 4952605, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2008) (imposing 
sanctions and describing a "concerted effort" by a party and its former lawyer "to mislead 
[the] court and gain an unfair advantage in [the] litigation"). 
43. 370 u.s. 626 (1962). 
44. /d. at 633. 
45. /d. at 627-29. The lawyer called the district judge's chambers roughly two hours 
before the long-scheduled pretrial conference to tell the judge he was too busy working on 
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was an unjust penalty.46 The Court rejected this argument as contrary to our 
system of representative litigation in language since widely quoted by 
courts: 
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim be-
cause of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. 
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he 
cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected 
agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of repre-
sentative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-
agent and is considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged 
upon the attomey.'"'7 
The lawyer's conduct was wildly irresponsible, and it is easy to see 
why the district court and the Supreme Court were offended by it to the 
point that a severe response was assured. Still, the Court in Link offered no 
agency law analysis to support its position.48 
A. Understanding Lawyers' Agency Status and Vicarious Liability 
In fact, when clients retain lawyers to represent them, the lawyers' 
agency status is settled: they are independent contractors.49 That is certainly 
lawyers' role in litigation.50 That does not mean that lawyers cannot bind 
clients contractually or otherwise, of course, because it is possible to be 
both an independent contractor and an agent.51 What it does mean, however, 
is that it is generally inappropriate to hold innocent clients vicariously liable 
for their lawyers' litigation-related misconduct based on the respondeat su-
perior doctrine.52 Agency status alone will not support vicarious liability 
under respondeat superior. 53 
another case to attend the pretrial conference, but he could make himself available on other 
days. !d. Because the judge was on the bench when he called, the lawyer left the message 
with the judge's secretary. !d. 
46. !d. at 633. 
47. !d. at 633-34 (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320,326 (1879)). 
48. !d. 
49. Ingersoll-Rand Equip. Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 963 F. Supp. 452, 455 (M.D. 
Pa. 1997) (applying Pennsylvania law); Plant v. Trust Co. of Columbus, 310 S.E.2d 745, 746 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272,277-79 (Ill. 2004); How-
ard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 782 n.9 (Mo. 2011); Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 
A.2d 458,464-65 (N.J. 1993). 
50. See Lynn v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 427, 428 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating 
that in their role as trial counsel, lawyers are independent contractors). 
51. Horwitz, 816 N.E.2d at 279; Parshall v. Buetzer, 195 S.W.3d 515, 519 n.5 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
52. See, e.g., Horwitz, 816 N.E.2d at 278 (concluding that where a lawyer "acts 
pursuant to the exercise of independent professional judgment, he or she acts presumptively 
as an independent contractor whose intentional misconduct may generally not be imputed to 
the client"); Ba/dasarre, 625 A.2d at 465 ("An innocent client should not be held vicariously 
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Like all general rules, the rule that a principal cannot be vicariously li-
able for an independent contractor's torts based on respondeat superior doc-
trine contains exceptions, the most relevant of which relates to control of an 
independent contractor's work. To explain, the defense to vicarious liability 
that an independent contractor's status as such generally provides may be 
lost if the person who engaged the independent contractor ordered or di-
rected the independent contractor's specific actions.54 As an Arkansas court 
outlined, when one who hires an independent contractor "goes beyond cer-
tain limits in the directing, supervising, or controlling the performance of 
the [independent contractor's] work, the relationship changes to that of em-
ployer-employee, and the employer is liable for the employee's torts."55 In 
other words, a principal's control over the details of an agent's activities 
transforms the principal into a master and the agent into a servant, and thus 
gives rise to vicarious liability. 
When analyzing this exception to the general rule of non-liability, the 
term "control" should be narrowly understood. 56 Indeed, for a principal to be 
vicariously liable for an independent contractor's actions, "[t]here must be 
such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely 
free to do the work in his own way."57 A general right to control the inde-
pendent contractor's work, on the other hand, furnishes no basis for vicari-
ous liability. 58 
Distinguishing between "agents," "servants," and "independent con-
tractors" has always been laborious. The Restatement (Third) of Agency has 
condensed or simplified vicarious liability terminology by abandoning 
liable for the wrongful conduct of his or her attorney ... if the client does not direct, advise, 
consent to or participate in the attorney's improper conduct."). 
53. Gonzales v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2011-224, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11); 76 
So. 3d 144 ("An agency relationship does not form the basis for vicarious liability. All serv-
ants may qualify as agents, but not all agents qualify as servants."); Bradt v. West, 892 
S.W.2d 56, 76 (Tex. App. 1994) ("The mere existence of an agency relationship is not 
enough to visit tort liability on a principal."). 
54. Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 394-95 (Tenn. 2002). 
55. Schmoll v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 290 S.W.3d 41, 50 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). 
56. See Appiah v. Hall, 7 A.3d 536, 554 (Md. 2010) (stating that "[g]eneral control" 
over an independent contractor's work will not support liability); Randall Noe Chrysler 
Dodge, LLP v. Oakley Tire Co., 308 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tex. App. 2010) (explaining the right 
to control in the independent contractor context); Singer v. New Tech Eng'g L.P., 2010 WY 
31, ~ 14, 227 P.3d 305, 311 (Wyo. 2010) (distinguishing control over the means and manner 
of the work from control over the end product; only the former defeats independent contrac-
tor status). 
57. Randall Noe Chrysler Dodge, LLP, 308 S.W.3d at 546; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 414 cmt. c (1965) (stating that for a person to be vicariously liable for 
an independent contractor's tortious conduct, "[t]here must be such a retention of a right of 
supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way"). 
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 414 cmt. c (1965). 
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"master" and "servant" in favor of"employer" and "employee."59 Under this 
approach, an employer is vicariously liable for torts committed by employ-
ees acting within the scope of their employment, with "employee" defined 
as "an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner 
and means of the agent's performance of work" for the principal.60 Regard-
less, the Restatement (Third) of Agency does not support holding faultless 
clients vicariously liable for their lawyers' wrongs, as a comment to Section 
2.04 makes clear: 
Respondeat superior is inapplicable when a principal does not have the right to 
control the actions of the agent that makes the relationship between principal and 
agent performing the service one of employment .... In general, employment con-
templates a continuing relationship and a continuing set of duties that the employer 
and employee owe to each other. Agents who are retained as the need arises and 
who are not otherwise employees of their principal normally operate their own 
business enterprises and are not, except in limited respects, integrated into the prin-
cipal's enterprise .... Therefore, respondeat superior does not apply.61 
Courts have been justifiably reluctant to hold clients liable for their 
lawyers' alleged misconduct.62 To be responsible for a lawyer's misconduct, 
a client generally "must be 'implicated in some way [beyond simply] having 
entrusted its representation to the [lawyer]. "'63 In the leading case of Hor-
witz v. Holabird & Root,64 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a claim that a 
client could generally be vicariously liable for its lawyers' tortious con-
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§§ 2.04, 7.07 (2007). 
60. !d. § 7.07(3)(a). 
61. /d. § 2.04 cmt. b. 
62. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Buckley, 79 F. App'x 637, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying 
Texas law); Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Like other 
courts, we disfavor sanctioning a party for counsel's misconduct unless the party itself is 
somehow implicated."); Bakker v. Grutman, 942 F.2d 236, 242 (4th Cir. 1991) (concluding 
that decision not to sanction plaintiffs was appropriate because they always acted on advice 
of counsel and entrusted to counsel all decisions in the litigation); Murray v. Playmaker 
Servs., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382-83 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (declining to award attorney's 
fees against plaintiff for litigating in bad faith, but awarding fees against plaintiff's counsel); 
Whiteside v. Infinity Cas. Ins. Co., No. 4:07-CV-87 (CDL), 2008 WL 3456508, at *14 (M.D. 
Ga. Aug. 8, 2008) (refusing to hold insurer liable for defense lawyers' alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duty in representation of insured where there was no evidence that the insurer '"au-
thorized, knew of, or ratified'" the alleged breaches (quoting Plant v. Trust Co. of Columbus, 
310 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)); Lynn v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 
(Ct. App. 1986) (discussing lawyer's role as trial counsel); Plant, 310 S.E.2d at 746-47 (dis-
cussing lawyer's role as independent contractor and scope of agency authority); Edelman, 
Combs & Lattumer v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 788 N.E.2d 740, 752-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) 
(discussing lawyer's status as independent contractor); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76-77 
(Tex. App. 1994) (discussing liability for sanctions as well as tort liability). 
63. Guthrie, 79 F. App'x at 639 (quoting Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 76). 
64. 816 N.E.2d 272 (Ill. 2004). 
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duct.65 In so holding, the Horwtiz court applied settled independent contrac-
tor doctrine. 66 
Horwitz arose out of a dispute between the plaintiffs and the architec-
tural firm of Holabird & Root over unpaid fees for architectural services. 67 
Holabird & Root retained the law firm of Sabo & Zahn to collect the plain-
tiffs' debt.68 Sabo & Zahn used sensitive information obtained from the 
plaintiffs pursuant to a confidentiality agreement in its collection efforts, 
and the plaintiffs' business relationships with their investors allegedly suf-
fered as a result.69 The plaintiffs sued both Sabo & Zahn and Holabird & 
Root on multiple theories, including tortious interference with business rela-
tionships.70 In one of the tortious interference counts, the plaintiffs asserted 
that Holabird & Root was liable "as a principal acting by and through its 
attorneys, Sabo & Zahn.m1 Holabird & Root won summary judgment on 
that count in the trial court, but an appellate court reversed, and the firm 
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.72 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Horwitz concluded that where a lawyer 
"acts pursuant to the exercise of independent professional judgment, he or 
she acts presumptively as an independent contractor whose intentional mis-
conduct may generally not be imputed to the client, subject to factual excep-
tions.'m The court observed that clients generally seek out lawyers because 
they are unfamiliar with the law and are therefore unable to perform the 
work for which they retain the lawyer.74 As a result, a lawyer "usually pur-
sues a client's legal rights without specific direction from the client [and 
exercises] independent professional judgment to determine the manner and 
form of the work.''75 A lawyer is thus properly characterized as an inde-
pendent contractor, and vicarious liability will not flow from the lawyer's 
actions.76 
The court noted that a person may be both an independent contractor 
and an agent with the power to bind a principal in business negotiations 
within the scope of her agency, and that lawyers generally "fit squarely 
within this category.'m Nonetheless: 
65. !d. at 277-81. 
66. See id. 
67. !d. at 274. 
68. Seeid. 
69. !d. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. 
72. !d. at 274-76. 
73. !d. at 278. 
74. !d. 
75. !d. at 279. 
76. !d. 
77. !d. 
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[W]hen attorneys act pursuant to the exercise of independent professional judg-
ment, they possess such considerable autonomy over the details and manner of per-
forming their work that they are presumptively independent contractors for purpos-
es of imposing vicarious liability. Accordingly, where a plaintiff seeks to hold a 
client vicariously liable for the attorney's allegedly intentional tortious conduct, a 
plaintiff must prove facts demonstrating either that the client specifically directed, 
controlled, or authorized the attorney's precise method of performing the work or 
that the client subsequently ratified acts performed in the exercise of the attorney's 
independent judgment. If there is no evidence that the client directed, controlled, 
authorized, or ratified the attorney's allegedly tortious conduct, no vicarious liabil-
ity can attach. 78 
There was no evidence that Holabird & Root influenced its lawyers' 
allegedly tortious conduct; indeed, there was no evidence that Holabird & 
Root knew of its lawyers' actions beforehand.79 The fact that Sabo & Zahn 
believed it was performing the task it was hired to accomplish when it 
committed the acts complained of did not establish that Holabird & Root 
authorized, controlled, or directed its lawyers' conduct so as to defeat the 
independent contractor barrier to vicarious liability.80 Nor was there any 
basis in the record for the plaintiffs to argue that Holabird & Root ratified 
Sabo & Zahn's alleged misdeeds.81 Among other things, there could be no 
ratification because Holabird & Root did not benefit from Sabo & Zahn's 
allegedly wrongful conduct. 82 
Continuing, the court dispatched the possible argument that the agency 
aspect of the attorney-client relationship, lawyers' duty of loyalty to clients, 
or lawyers' duty to defer to clients in accordance with certain rules of pro-
fessional conduct undercut its conclusion.83 The court specifically noted that 
lawyers "cannot blindly follow their clients' directions, even if those direc-
tions are particular and express, if doing so would require them to violate 
their ethical obligations."84 In fact, a number of ethics rules mandate law-
yers' exercise of independent professional judgment and prohibit them from 
acting in accordance with clients' directions or instructions under certain 
circumstances. 85 
Finally, the court noted that practical considerations compelled its 
conclusion.86 Were it to hold otherwise, the court reasoned, it would effec-
78. !d. 
79. !d. 
80. !d. at 279-80. 
81. /d. at 280. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. at 280-81. The court specifically refuted a comment to Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency § 253 that seemed to discount lawyers' professional obligations as a factor 
supporting lawyers' characterization as independent contractors. !d. at 280. 
84. !d. 
85. !d. at 280-81 (citing ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 2.1, 1.2(t), 1.2(i), 
1.16(a)(l), preamble (2003)). 
86. !d. at 281. 
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tively require clients to micromanage their representations, to supervise 
everything their lawyers do, and to seize control of their cases at the first 
sign of potential misconduct by their lawyers.87 Such intense monitoring 
would be impossible for most clients and few would be qualified to attempt 
it.88 The duty to supervise lawyers' conduct would make plaintiffs reluctant 
to sue and discourage defendants from vigorously defending themselves, 
thus chilling the willingness of all Illinois citizens to vindicate their legal 
rights.89 It would also have the effect of making litigants responsible for 
their own representations, when, in fact, they had hired lawyers for that pur-
pose.90 
The reasoning of Horwitz and the other courts that have reached simi-
lar conclusions in tort cases apply equally to clients' vicarious liability for 
sanctions.91 There is no material difference in this context between vicarious 
tort liability and liability for sanctions premised on respondeat superior.92 As 
a result, lawyers' independent contractor status should shield clients from 
vicarious liability for sanctions solely attributable to their lawyers' miscon-
duct. 
B. Courts' Soft and Sporadic Retreat from Link 
Although it should be plain that merely characterizing a lawyer as a 
client's agent is too simplistic a basis for imposing vicarious liability for 
sanctions, Link's agency rationale for holding clients accountable for their 
lawyers' misconduct endures.93 Nonetheless, courts wisely appear to be re-
87. /d. 
88. /d. 
89. /d. 
90. /d. (citing Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 77 (Tex. App. 1994)). 
91. See Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 76-77 (analogizing vicarious liability for sanctions and 
vicarious liability in tort). 
92. See id. 
93. See, e.g., Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922-24 (2012) (reciting Link and 
claiming to leave the decision and its reasoning undisturbed, but avoiding the holding by 
reasoning that in the case before it the lawyer-agents had abandoned their client); Wescott 
Agri-Prods., Inc. v. Sterling State Bank, Inc., 682 F.3d 1091, 1096 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962)) (invoking Link in refusing to award attor-
ney's fees to punish litigation misconduct); Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 
409-10 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding sanction of dismissal based on Link); Gripe v. City of 
Enid, Oklahoma, 312 F.3d 1184, 1189 (lOth Cir. 2002) (examining Link in connection with 
dismissal of plaintiffs case for his lawyer's repeated failure to comply with court orders); 
Top Entrn't, Inc. v. Ortega, 285 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Link and using the 
opinion as authority for "reject[ing] the argument that appellants should not be punished for 
the misdeeds of their counsel"); Eby v. State, 228 P.3d 998, 1003-04 (Idaho 2010) (referring 
to Link in discussing whether the petitioner was potentially entitled to post-conviction relief 
based on counsel's neglect); Lisanti v. Amper, Politziner & Mattia, P.C., No. L3184-04, 
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treating from the holding in Link and, when possible, attempting to address 
litigation misconduct by lawyers and clients separately rather than treating 
them as unitary when imposing sanctions.94 A Third Circuit case, Carter v. 
Albert Einstein Medical Center,95 is illustrative. 
In Carter, the district court dismissed plaintiff Frederick Carter's 
complaint after his lawyer failed to comply with a discovery order and later 
failed to respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss for failing to provide 
the required discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.96 Suffice it 
to say that the lawyer had been inexcusably dilatory leading up to the dis-
missal.97 Acting pro se, Carter moved for reconsideration.98 Carter alleged 
that his lawyer had misled him into believing she had complied with the 
discovery order and that he learned otherwise only when he checked the 
court's docket on his own initiative.99 The district court faulted Carter for 
trusting his lawyer as long as he did and not proceeding on his own sooner, 
and denied his motion. 100 Still acting pro se, Carter appealed to the Third 
Circuit. 101 
The Third Circuit concluded that the district court should have sanc-
tioned Carter's lawyer personally rather than dismissing Carter's case. 102 
The court noted that while "the Link principle remain[ ed] valid," it had "in-
creasingly emphasized visiting sanctions directly on the delinquent lawyer, 
rather than on a client who is not actually at fault." 103 The court also dis-
counted the alternative approach of affirming the dismissal and leaving 
Carter to sue his lawyer for legal malpractice as speculative and ineffi-
cient.104 As the court explained: 
Although an action for malpractice is a possibility when a lawyer's negli-
gence results in dismissal, that remedy does not always prove satisfactory. It may 
be difficult for the client to obtain and collect a judgment for damages. Perhaps 
more importantly, public confidence in the administration of justice is weakened 
when a party is prevented from presenting his case because of the gross negligence 
2009 WL 465564, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 26, 2009) (citing Link for the propo-
sition that "clients carry responsibility in monitoring their attorneys"). 
94. See Kovacic v. Tyco Valves & Controls, LP, 433 F. App'x 376, 380 (6th Cir. 
2011) (citing Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir. 1994)); Smith v. 
United States, 834 F.2d 166, 171 (lOth Cir. 1987) (noting this shift in approach by federal 
courts). 
95. 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1986). 
96. /d. at 806. 
97. See id. at 807 (calling the lawyer's conduct "inexcusable" and "flagrant and 
deserving of sanctions"). 
98. Id. at 806. 
99. !d. 
100. See id. at 806-07. 
10 I. !d. at 806. 
102. !d. 
103. Id. at 807. 
104. !d. at 808. 
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of his lawyer who is, after all, an officer of the court. As we pointed out in Poulis, 
this remedy "would only multiply, rather than dispose of litigation." 
We think it critical that the importance of an attorney's professional re-
sponsibility for his client's interest be brought home to the erring lawyer quickly 
and unmistakably. Allowing derelictions to await possible punishment through 
lengthy malpractice litigation or disciplinary board proceedings is not likely to be 
effective in deterring future misconduct. 105 
849 
In the end, the Third Circuit decided that Carter's complaint should be 
reinstated and that he should be given reasonable time to retain new counsel 
or to proceed pro se. 106 The court acknowledged that the defendant had in-
curred unnecessary legal fees because of the dereliction of Carter's former 
lawyer. 107 Because this loss could be cured by imposing monetary sanctions 
on the lawyer personally, the Third Circuit directed the district court on 
remand to assess such sanctions in an amount reasonable under the circum-
stances. 108 
Although the district court in Carter criticized the plaintiff for not 
seizing control of his case sooner than he did, the lawyer clearly bore all 
fault for the plaintiff's predicament. 109 In departing from Link the Third 
Circuit simply chose to disregard the Supreme Court's concept of agency in 
representational litigation in the interest of faimess. 110 Interestingly, in other 
cases where courts have adhered to the rule that clients are responsible for 
their lawyers' misconduct when it comes to sanctions, they arguably were 
influenced by the fact that the sanctioned party was complicit in the wrong-
ful conduct. 111 
In Wade v. Soo Line Railroad Corp., 112 for example, the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal ofplaintiffMichael Wade's com-
plaint as a sanction for his lawyer's misconduct in discovery, stating that 
"[a ]ttomeys' actions are imputed to their clients, even when those actions 
cause substantial harm. A litigant bears the risk of errors made by his cho-
105. !d. (citations omitted) (quoting Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 
863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
106. !d. 
107. !d. 
108. !d. 
109. !d. at 806-07. 
110. See id. at 807-08 (setting forth the rationale for the court's decision). 
Ill. But see Ozeroglu v. Hershewe Law Firm, P.C., 451 F. App'x 620, 621 (8th Cir. 
2011) (affirming sanctions against client based solely upon lawyer's misconduct in rigid 
adherence to the rule that clients are responsible for their lawyers' actions and dismissing the 
harshness of this result by reasoning that aggrieved clients may sue their lawyers for mal-
practice); In reMarriage of Davenport, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292,306-16, 315 n.17 (Ct. App. 
2011) (sanctioning a party for her lawyer's serious misconduct pursuant to a California stat-
ute mandating that result). 
112. 500 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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sen agent." 113 Wade's lawyer was George Brugess. 114 The immediate cause 
ofthe court's displeasure was Brugess's calculated concealment of evidence 
that would have revealed a scheme to defraud Wade's employer. 115 In short, 
Wade falsely claimed to have hurt himself on the job, and a doctor with 
whom Brugess had a continuing professional relationship was willing to 
falsify his diagnosis to support Wade's allegations to the extent he could. 116 
But as that description of the controversy indicates, Wade was neck deep in 
the wrongful conduct. 117 Indeed, he set the case in motion with his dishones-
ty, and he never came clean once litigation was underway. 118 Wade is there-
fore best understood as a joint and several liability case based on the coor-
dinated effort of the lawyer and client. 
C. Apparent Authority as a Basis for Sanctions 
Even if a principal is not vicariously liable for an independent contrac-
tor's tortious conduct under respondeat superior, the principal may still be 
liable based on agency law if the independent contractor acted with apparent 
authority. 119 Vicarious liability based on respondeat superior and liability 
premised on apparent authority are separate theories of responsibility. 120 
Thus, a client may be liable for its lawyer's misconduct even though the 
lawyer is an independent contractor if the lawyer acted with apparent au-
thority .121 Backing up for a moment, "apparent authority" describes the 
power of an agent or other actor "to affect a principal's . . . relations with 
third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority 
to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's 
manifestations."122 
The argument that a client may be sanctioned for its lawyer's miscon-
duct based on the lawyer's apparent authority assumes that the client-
principal, by enlisting the lawyer's services, "represents to the opposing 
party and to the court that the attorney-agent has the authority to speak and 
113. !d. at 564. 
114. !d. at 560. 
115. !d. at 560-62. 
116. !d. 
117. See id. 
118. /d. at 560-62. 
119. Grease Monkey Int'l, Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d 468,473 (Colo. 1995); Jones v. 
HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 206 P.3d 473, 477-78 (Idaho 2009); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 7.08 (2007). 
120. Inter Mountain Mortg., Inc. v. Sulimen, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 794 n.4 (Ct. App. 
2000); Grease Monkey Int 'I, Inc., 904 P.2d at 473. 
121. Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the 
Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REv. 346, 357-59 (2007). 
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 2.03 (2007). 
.-..... 
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act as is customary in such a setting."123 But that approach will not support 
sanctioning an innocent client for its lawyer's alleged offenses because the 
lawyer's authority "to speak and act as is customary" should not be held to 
encompass misconduct by the lawyer. 124 As a Georgia court stated, a client's 
"general retention of an attorney to do all things necessary to pursue a claim 
or defense ... should in legal contemplation mean the attorney has authority 
to do all things legal and proper; not otherwise."125 Certainly, in ordinary 
cases clients do not manifest to other parties or to the court that their law-
yers are authorized to commit misconduct. 126 It would be unreasonable for 
an adversary or a court to rely on a lawyer's mere representation of a party 
to invoke apparent authority as a basis for sanctions because the types of 
misconduct for which sanctions are imposed do not reflect regular litigation 
practice, are not customary features of relationships between lawyers and 
judges or between lawyers and other counsel, and are detrimental to the 
client. 127 Apparent authority cannot be based solely on the target lawyer's 
conduct or statements. 128 
The fact that courts should not presume lawyers' apparent authority to 
act for clients in this context does not mean that a client will necessarily 
avoid sanctions for its lawyer's actions. A court that is concerned that a 
client may have authorized a lawyer's misconduct may always inquire into 
that possibility by hearing or otherwise. 129 If the client authorized or ratified 
the alleged misconduct, then the client may be sanctioned for acting in con-
cert with the lawyer. In that case, however, the client is being sanctioned for 
his own misdeeds rather than being held vicariously liable for his lawyer's 
misconduct. 
This is a difficult area because of the nature of apparent authority. It is 
sometimes hard to demarcate those things agents may do and those they 
may not. 130 It is important, however, to recognize the distinction between the 
consequences of a lawyer's errors, which a client may have to bear via ap-
parent authority, and sanctions for a lawyer's sole misconduct, which the 
lawyer should bear alone. This difference is illustrated below. 
123. Giese!, supra note 121, at 361. 
124. Plant v. Trust Co. of Columbus, 310 S.E.2d 745,747 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
125. !d.; see also Phx. Ins. Co. v. Terrazzano, No. 34 15 39, 1993 WL 104423, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1993) (citing Plant, 310 S.E.2d 745). 
126. Plant,310S.E.2dat747. 
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03, cmt. c, d (2007) (explaining 
apparent authority, the rationale for apparent authority, and the reasonable belief element of 
apparent authority). 
128. !d. § 2.03 cmt. c. 
129. See Plant, 310 S.E.2d at 747 (stating that "the circumstances of the particular 
case must be examined" when deciding whether to hold a party responsible for its lawyer's 
abusive conduct). 
130. GREGORY, supra note 29, § 21, at 59. 
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In Case A, a lawyer fails to appear for a pretrial conference because 
she forgets about it, and the court dismisses the client's case as a conse-
quence of her failure. In Case B, the lawyer deliberately blows off the pre-
trial conference either because he is unhappy with the client or because he 
considers another client's matter to be more important. Regardless, the court 
dismisses the client's case based on the lawyer's failure to appear. 
In Case A, the lawyer's failure to appear at the pretrial conference 
saddles the client with the consequences under apparent authority doctrine 
because (1) the other parties and the court could reasonably rely on the law-
yer to appear for the client as scheduled; and (2) the client can fairly be said 
to have assumed the risk of the lawyer's inadvertent procedural failures 
within the temporary confines of the proceeding. If the client cannot get the 
default set aside based on excusable neglect or a similar principle, its reme-
dy is to sue the lawyer for professional negligence, file an ethics complaint 
against the lawyer, or both. In contrast, in Case B, the client is not bound by 
the lawyer's apparent authority because an agent's actions are not imputed 
to the principal where the agent's interests are adverse to the principal's.I31 
Certainly, in Case B, the lawyer's interests were adverse to the client's. 132 
So, too, can adversity be presumed in any case of reckless or intentional 
misconduct by a lawyer that warrants sanctions. 133 Putting aside for the 
moment the legal precept that a client's retention of a lawyer to pursue a 
claim or defense should mean the lawyer's authority is confined to those 
efforts that are "legal and proper,"134 as a factual matter it is an extraordi-
131. McRaith v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 909 N.E.2d 310, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) 
("Generally, the knowledge and conduct of agents are imputed to their principals .... An 
exception to this rule exists where the agent's interests are adverse to the principal."). The 
client in Case B might also be able to argue that it should not be bound by its lawyer's ac-
tions because the lawyer abandoned it. See Seacall Dev., Ltd. v. Santa Monica Rent Control 
Bd., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 231 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining abandonment theory); Willis v. 
Placke, 903 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the general rule that the negli-
gence of a party's lawyer is imputed to the party, but recognizing an exception to this rule 
where there is evidence that the lawyer abandoned the client without notice). What consti-
tutes abandonment of a client depends on the facts of the particular case. Seaca/1 Dev., Ltd., 
86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231. Even where a client can demonstrate its abandonment by its lawyer, 
however, courts also consider equitable factors in deciding whether to afford the client relief. 
!d. at 231-32 (listing factors that courts consider). 
132. Similarly, a court might hold that the lawyer's actions cannot be imputed to the 
client because the lawyer acted in bad faith. See Phx. Ins. Co. v. Terrazzano, No. 34 15 39, 
1993 WL 104423, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1993) (stating that a lawyer's conduct 
cannot be imputed to the client when the lawyer acts in bad faith). 
133. That presumption can be overcome by a showing that the lawyer acted with the 
client's actual authority or that the client ratified the misconduct. See Horwitz v. Holabird & 
Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 278-79 (Ill. 2004). The court may scrutinize the circumstances of the 
case either on its own initiative or because another party requests that it do so. See Plant, 310 
S.E.2d at 747. 
134. Terrazzano, 1993 WL 104423, at *2; Plant, 310 S.E.2d at 747. 
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nary case in which a client authorizes its lawyer to engage in the sort of 
activities that might draw sanctions. As a rule, clients authorize their law-
yers only to reasonably advance their objectives. 135 There is no logical rea-
son to believe that most clients would knowingly authorize the harm to their 
cases that misconduct by their lawyers might wreak. Indeed, clients seldom 
can be said to have even contemplated misconduct by their lawyers. 
D. Summary and Synthesis 
Agency law seldom supplies a basis for holding innocent clients liable 
for lawyers' misconduct. Respondeat superior liability rarely fits the attor-
ney-client relationship. When representing clients, lawyers presumptively 
are independent contractors. 136 Exercising their independent professional 
judgment, lawyers assert claims and defenses, decide what arguments to 
make or emphasize and which to subordinate or abandon, prepare pleadings 
and briefs, formulate discovery responses and evaluate what discovery to 
resist, decide what discovery should be undertaken and how it should be 
conducted, pursue fact investigations, retain expert witnesses, schedule key 
events, argue before courts, and more-all with little or no client guidance. 
Indeed, it is common for clients to be unaware of lawyers' specific activities 
until afterwards. The client's control of the objectives of the representation 
is not sufficient control to implicate the respondeat superior doctrine.137 
"Control" for purposes of respondeat superior liability is granular or intru-
sive; it describes a right more detailed than the right of control that all prin-
cipals possess. 138 
The alternative theory of apparent authority liability is also inapposite. 
A client's mere retention of a lawyer does not cloak the lawyer with appar-
ent authority to engage in misconduct. 139 As a general rule, a lawyer's ap-
parent authority to act for a client is limited to conduct that is "legal and 
proper."140 In most cases, clients do not manifest to other parties or to the 
court that their lawyers are authorized to commit misconduct. 
135. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 27 cmt. c (2000) 
(explaining that "a lawyer has apparent authority to do acts that reasonably appear to be 
calculated to advance the client's objectives in the representation"); STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 72 (2004) (stating that it is generally assumed 
that principals will never authorize agents to be negligent). 
136. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 135, at 64 (explaining that this position is based on the 
fact that "clients have little, if any, control over the day-to-day conduct of their lawyer"). 
137. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) (stating that 
"a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation"). 
138. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 2.04 cmt. b (2007). 
139. Terrazzano, 1993 WL 104423, at *2; Plant, 310 S.E.2d at 747. 
140. Terrazzano, 1993 WL 104423, at *2; Plant, 310 S.E.2d at 747. 
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For a client to be sanctioned for a lawyer's misconduct under agency 
principles, the client must authorize, control, direct, or ratify the lawyer's 
misdeeds. 141 In cases of actual authority and ratification, the client has as-
sented to bearing the consequences of its lawyer's misconduct. If the client 
sufficiently controls or directs the lawyer's misconduct, the client effective-
ly converts the lawyer from an independent contractor into an employee and 
thus exposes itself to potential vicarious liability. It is certainly possible that 
a client might do just that, as where a corporate general counsel immerses 
herself in litigation being handled by outside counsel and guides the law-
yers' strategy and tactics in minute detail. 142 
Embracing independent contractor doctrine and thereby rejecting in-
nocent clients' vicarious liability for lawyers' sanctionable misconduct as 
the presumptive rule is potentially controversial. First, it appears to contra-
dict the established principle that "parties are bound by the actions (and 
failures to act) of their attomeys."143 Visiting lawyers' sins on their clients 
supposedly inheres in the adversary system. 144 Proponents of this position 
might argue that any other rule would make representative litigation un-
manageable. To the extent a party's lawyer errs, the proper course of action 
is not to relieve the party from the lawyer's mistake, but to allow the party 
to sue the lawyer for malpractice. 145 
But this principle is not as absolute as its advocates would suggest. In 
fact, parties may sometimes be relieved from the consequences of their law-
yers' actions or inaction if they can establish excusable neglect146 or if they 
can demonstrate their lawyers' gross negligence. 147 Various jurisdictions 
allow parties to escape default based on their lawyers' errors. 148 In Montana, 
for example, a party may obtain relief from a judgment if it can show (1) 
141. Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 278-79 (Ill. 2004); Clients' Sec. 
Fund of the Bar of N.J. v. Sec. Title & Guar. Co., 607 A.2d 1319, 1326 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1992). 
142. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 304 
(1998) (recognizing this possibility). 
143. Eby v. State, 228 P.3d 998, I 003 (Idaho 2010). 
144. Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 
Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320,326 (1879)); Cruz v. Municipality of Dorado, 780 F. Supp. 2d 
157, 160 (D.P.R. 2011) (citing Vallejo v. Santini-Padilla, 607 F.3d I, 9 (1st Cir. 2010)). 
145. Ozeroglu v. Hershewe Law Firm, P.C., 451 F. App'x 620, 621 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 596-97 (8th Cir. 2001)); Eby, 228 P.3d 
at 1004. 
146. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l) (permitting a court to relieve a party from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable ne-
glect"). 
147. Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010). 
148. See, e.g., Winthrop Univ. Hosp. v. Metro. Suburban Bus Auth., 910 N.Y.S.2d 
159, 160 (App. Div. 2010) (excusing defendant's default based on the "reasonable excuse" of 
"law office failure"). 
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"extraordinary circumstances, such as gross neglect or actual misconduct by 
an attorney"; (2) that it moved "to set aside the judgment within a reasona-
ble period of time"; and (3) that it "was blameless.'' 149 To be sure, relief 
based on excusable neglect and similar concepts is the exception rather than 
the rule, 150 but cases in which innocent clients seek to avoid sanctions for 
their counsel's misconduct similarly represent a small portion of litigated 
matters. 
Correctly identifying lawyers as independent contractors does not 
change opposing parties' ability to rely on their representations or procedur-
al compliance because independent contractors are still their principals' 
agents and still possess actual and apparent authority to bind their principals 
as to the various types of agreements commonly made in litigation. 151 The 
argument that a client could escape the consequences of her lawyer's proce-
dural failures or tactical blunders by invoking the lawyer's independent 
contractor status ignores (1) actual and apparent authority doctrine;152 (2) the 
fact that consequences of lawyers' procedural defaults, tactical errors, and 
similar missteps are generally only that-they are not "sanctions" (which 
ties back to actual and apparent authority);153 and (3) the fact that deadlines 
and procedural requirements are reasonably equivalent to contractual obli-
gations to which agents may bind principals. 154 On this last point, the Su-
preme Court has observed that scheduling matters are among those actions 
or decisions entrusted to counsel, such that lawyers may commit their cli-
ents to them. 155 
Of course, the recognition that actual and apparent authority may re-
quire clients to bear the consequences of lawyers' procedural defaults does 
not mean that those doctrines must in tum provide a basis for sanctioning 
clients for their lawyers' misconduct. Again, misconduct by lawyers war-
149. In reMarriage of Orcutt, 2011 MT 107, ~ 12,360 Mont. 353,253 P.3d 884. 
150. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 
2005) (concluding that counsel's failure to request continuance of summary judgment hear-
ing due to conduct falling below the professional standard of care did not constitute excusa-
ble neglect). 
151. GREGORY, supra note 29, § 7, at 18-19, § 21, at 59. 
152. See Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ind. 1998) (explain-
ing that a client's retention of a lawyer equips the lawyer with "the inherent power to bind 
[the] client to the results of a procedure in court"). 
153. This point is illustrated by the decision in United States v. Daugerdas, No. S3 09 
Cr. 58l(WHP), 2012 WL 2149238 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012), in which the court held that the 
failure by lawyers for defendant David Parse to alert the court to a juror's dishonest answers 
during voir dire waived Parse's right to a new trial based on the juror's misconduct. Jd. at 
*28-*37. The waiver was simply the consequence of the lawyers' failure to act as they rea-
sonably should have; the court did not impose the waiver as a sanction. Jd. at *37. 
154. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008). 
155. !d. (citing New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000)). 
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ranting sanctions is generally not the sort of action that clients may reasona-
bly be said to have actually or apparently authorized.156 
Second, vicarious liability advocates argue that it is wrong to shield 
innocent clients from the effects of their lawyers' misconduct because it is 
not they whp need protection, but, rather, the innocent third parties who are 
harmed by the lawyers' misconduct. 157 Professor Grace Giesel, for one, as-
serts that "special treatment for clients is misguided" because a "wronged 
client has the protection of both the attorney discipline system and a mal-
practice action."158 Courts have articulated similar views. 159 This position is 
tenuous at best. 
To begin with, third parties who are aggrieved by an opposing law-
yer's misconduct also have the protection of the professional discipline sys-
tem. Rules of professional conduct contain no privity requirement; anyone 
may report allegedly unethical conduct by a lawyer to the appropriate pro-
fessional authorities. Even if a lawyer's misconduct has caused some finan-
cial harm to a third-party or imposed costs on a court, that is still no basis 
for holding the lawyer's client responsible. In an appropriate case a court 
can compensate the injured third-party or recoup its own loss by imposing 
monetary sanctions against the offending lawyer personally. 16° Finally, forc-
ing the client to sue its lawyer for malpractice is inefficient because it cre-
ates unnecessary additional litigation that will further jam the already 
crowded docket of any court in which it is filed. 161 It certainly subjects the 
client to unnecessary aggravation and expense. Such delay in penalizing the 
lawyer also dilutes any deterrent effect that might result from the immediate 
imposition of sanctions on the lawyer. 162 Of course, even if the client ulti-
156. Phx. Ins. Co. v. Terrazzano, No. 34 15 39, 1993 WL 104423, at *2 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Mar. 25, 1993); Plant v. Trust Co. of Columbus, 310 S.E.2d 745,747 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1983). 
157. Giese!, supra note 121, at 349. 
158. !d. 
159. See, e.g., Ozeroglu v. Hershewe Law Firm, P.C., 451 F. App'x 620, 621 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (referring to malpractice action as a remedy); Gripe v. City of Enid, Oklahoma, 
312 F.3d 1184, 1189 (lOth Cir. 2002) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.IO 
(1962)) (referring to legal malpractice liability). 
160. See, e.g., Toborg v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-150 (GLSIRFT), 2012 WL 
3643841, at *2-*3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) (opting to impose monetary sanctions against 
lawyer rather than party where the lawyer admitted that he alone was responsible for the 
discovery delays warranting sanctions); FED. R. Civ. P. ll(c)(l) (permitting a court to sanc-
tion lawyers and law firms). 
161. See Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 808 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing 
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984)) (noting that this 
approach multiplies litigation). 
162. !d. 
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mately sues the lawyer and prevails, there is no guarantee that the client will 
be able to collect the judgment from the lawyer. 163 
Third, the weight of authority bluntly describes lawyers as clients' 
"agents." With rare exception, courts do not distinguish between types of 
agents in this context. That may stem from the concern that different termi-
nology would signal an unwise retreat from the principle that clients are 
bound by their lawyers' actions. As the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers notes, yoking clients and lawyers has the advantage of 
requiring the client to bear the cost of the lawyer's misconduct rather than 
imposing such costs on an innocent third party. 164 But as the Restatement-
which uses broad agency terminology in its comments-further observes, 
clients may be excused from the consequences of their lawyers' misconduct 
when that can be done without seriously harming others.165 More particular-
ly, the Restatement explains that courts may depart from the traditional 
agency regime when evaluating whether a client should be sanctioned for its 
lawyer's misconduct. 166 
A tribunal considering whether to impose sanctions on a litigant ... can go beyond 
the usual assumption ... that acts done by a lawyer in the litigant's name were 
done in accordance with the litigant's wishes. Sanctions against clients and lawyers 
for procedural defaults and misconduct have become increasingly common .... 
Courts are generally accorded broad discretion when deciding whether to grant a 
litigant a second chance, for example by allowing a new trial or an amendment to a 
pleading or setting aside a default. 167 
Actually, the Restatement's invitation to courts to "go beyond the usu-
al assumption" that clients are bound by their lawyers' acts or inaction sug-
gests that the simplest way for courts to avoid the complexities of agency 
theory in the sanctions context is to, well, avoid agency theory.168 The fact 
that questions concerning responsibility for sanctions may be answered un-
der agency law does not mean they must be. Courts can easily discard agen-
cy law in this context. Sanctions include a significant equitable compo-
nent.169 It is therefore reasonable for courts weighing sanctions to avoid the 
163. !d. For this reason, a court that invokes a client's theoretical malpractice remedy 
against its lawyer "should ascertain whether that is a meaningful alternative, given the nature 
and amount of the relief sought in the action and the wherewithal of counsel to provide a 
meaningful remedy." JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 5(E)(1)(c)(iii), at 2-68; see also id. § 
16(E)(l)(a), at 2-296 (making the same point). 
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS § 26 cmt. b (2000). 
165. !d. 
166. !d. § 29 cmt. d. 
167. !d. 
168. See Mureiko, supra note 28, at 754 (urging courts to abandon the agency theory 
when deciding whether to sanction "a relatively innocent client"). 
169. See, e.g., Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 83 (3d Cir. 2012) (stat-
ing that "all sanctions originate from the realm of equity"); Ford v. Temple Hosp., 790 F.2d 
342, 34 7 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that a court must "balance the equities" when deciding to 
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murky or complicating aspects of agency law and allocate responsibility 
between lawyers and clients based on concepts of fairness and the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case. 
When balancing the equities, courts should consider the interests of all 
concerned, including opposing parties. 170 The court may also consider the 
effect of the challenged conduct on it and the judicial process as a whole. 171 
Courts' avoidance of agency law is also consistent with their inherent 
authority to manage their affairs in ways that promote the orderly and effec-
tive disposition of cases. It is certainly reasonable to believe that individual 
cases and courts' dockets overall are more effectively and efficiently admin-
istered when irresponsible lawyers personally bear the consequences of their 
actions. 
More acutely, any allegations of misconduct by a lawyer that are al-
leged to justify sanctions or an award of damages against the party the law-
yer represents risk derailing the case because of the potential conflict of 
interest between the lawyer and the client. 172 There should be no conflict if 
the lawyer and client are able to present a common defense to the oppo-
nent's allegations of wrongdoing,173 but such unity of interests is not as-
sured. It may be necessary for the client to waive its attorney-client privi-
lege or work product immunity to defend itself, and the lawyer will natural-
ly be required to withdraw from the case if she and the client must point 
fingers at one another in their defense. 174 A lawyer's advocacy of a position 
award attorneys' fees as a sanction under 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Jestice v. Buchanan, No. 
Civ.A.l987-S, 2000 WL 875417, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2000) (declining to find that "the 
equities favor[ed] sanctions" against the defendant); Pub. Entity Pool for Liab. v. Score, 
2003 SD 17, ~ 23, 658 N.W.2d 64, 72 (affirming trial court's reduction of attorney's fees 
awarded as a sanction for discovery misconduct after balancing "the severity of the sanction 
and the equities of the parties"); State v. Guthrie, 2002 SD 138, ~~ 13-14, 654 N.W.2d 201, 
205-06 (reasoning that the "additional equities of the situation" warranted a reduction of the 
sanction). 
170. Courts routinely balance prejudice to opposing parties when deciding whether 
the involuntary dismissal of the plaintiff's case is an appropriate sanction. See, e.g., Kasalo v. 
Harris & Harris, Ltd., 656 F.3d 557, 559, 561 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing involuntary dismis-
sal of plaintiff's case); Kovacic v. Tyco Valves & Controls, LP, 433 F. App'x 376, 381-83 
(6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal); West v. Goord, 423 F. App'x 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(reversing dismissal in part because defendants were not prejudiced). 
171. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 (1988). 
172. See Crawford v. Katz, 32 A.3d 418,435 (D.C. 2011) (citing Healey v. Chelsea 
Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 623 (2d Cir. 1991)) (noting that a potential conflict of interest is 
inherent when a party seeks sanctions against a client and lawyer jointly). 
173. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof) Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 
1997-151 (1997) [hereinafter Formal Op. 1997-151]. 
174. Id; see also JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 16(E)(2), at 2-300 (observing that when a 
court is called upon to allocate sanctions between parties and their lawyers, "[t]he risk of 
intruding on the attorney-client relationship is exacerbated by the fact that counsel are at 
liberty to disclose privileged information to exonerate themselves"). 
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antagonistic to a client in this context presents a conflict of interest that can-
not be waived. 175 In some cases, such disruption of the attomey--dient rela-
tionship may in fact be one of the opponent's goals in seeking sanctions or 
in otherwise attempting to impute the lawyer's conduct to the client. 176 Re-
gardless, the case is bound to be delayed and complicated as a result, with a 
ripple effect on the court's docket. 
II. DETERMINING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SANCTIONS: BEYOND AGENCY 
Courts are increasingly discarding blunt agency principles and reject-
ing the historical view that clients should bear the brunt of sanctions at-
tributable to their lawyers' misconduct. This is a positive development that 
should be encouraged. In some cases, however, it is not feasible for courts 
to remedy lawyers' misconduct without sanctioning clients either directly or 
indirectly. 
A. The Trend Toward Personal Accountability and Away from Vicarious 
Liability 
When considering sanctions, some courts continue to adhere to sim-
plistic notions of agency and visit lawyers' misconduct on their innocent 
clients. 177 These courts are glued to the idea that clients choose lawyers at 
their peril and that parties are uniformly responsible for their lawyers' ac-
tions.178 Increasingly, however, courts are willing to focus sanctions on cui-
175. Fonna!Op.l997-151,supranote 173. 
176. Some lawyers allegedly make a habit of accusing opposing counsel of miscon-
duct for tactical gain. See, e.g., United States v. Forbes, No. 3:02CR00264 (AWT), 2006 WL 
680562, at *I (D. Conn. Mar. 16, 2006) (observing that defense counsel "had engaged in a 
pattern in this case of arguing, premised on speculation, that opposing counsel had engaged 
in improper conduct"). 
177. See, e.g., Ozeroglu v. Hershewe Law Firm, P.C., 451 F. App'x 620,621-22 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (citing Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 596-97 (8th Cir. 2001)); 
Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403,409 (4th Cir. 2010) (penalizing client for his 
lawyer's "willful blindness" related to case scheduling); Comiskey v. JFTJ Corp., 989 F.2d 
1007, 1010 (8th Cir. 1993) (entering default judgment despite there being no evidence that 
party committed any misconduct and over party's complaint that discovery misconduct "was 
the sole fault of its prior counsel"). In some cases, courts may lessen the effect of their sanc-
tions rulings on innocent parties by assessing the overwhelming amount of fault for the mis-
conduct, and thus the vast majority of any monetary penalty in cases in which monetary 
sanctions are imposed, against the culpable lawyers. See, e.g., Libaire v. Kaplan, No. 06 CV 
1500(DRH)(ETB), 2012 WL 273080, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012) (concluding that the 
plaintiff should be responsible for 10% of the sanctions award, with the plaintiff's lawyers 
bearing 90%). Although this approach may be less unfair to an innocent client, it is not fair. 
178. Wescott Agri-Prods., Inc. v. Sterling State Bank, Inc., 682 F.3d 1091, 1096 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)); Ozeroglu, 451 F. 
App'x at 621 (citing Nick, 270 F.3d at 596): Robinson, 599 F.3d at 409 (citing Link, 370 U.S. 
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pable lawyers rather than imputing liability for lawyers' misdeeds to inno-
cent clients. 179 Under this approach, the mere fact that a client entrusted its 
representation to a lawyer is no basis for sanctioning the client when the 
lawyer acts wrongfully. 180 Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Industries, Inc., 181 leads 
this line of authority. 
Rentz arose out of a protracted business dispute between plaintiff 
Richard Rentz and four defendants: former National Football League star 
wide receiver Paul Warfield and his company, Jemesco, Inc., and brothers 
Armando and Ignacio Mendez. 182 In summary, Rentz alleged that the de-
fendants reneged on promises to pay him a commission for helping to ar-
range for the Menendez brothers to obtain a license to produce NFL apparel 
for sale by Kmart and other retailers. 183 Unfortunately for Rentz, he never 
reduced his agreements with the Mendez brothers or Warfield to writing.184 
Rentz sued the defendants on several theories, including breach of 
contract. 185 He was represented by lawyers Paul Leonard and Randall 
Roach. 186 During his deposition, Rentz testified that he had no contract with 
Jemesco and that while he had an understanding with Warfield, his commis-
sion "was coming out of the deal," such that he "suppose[ d]" the Mendez 
brothers were actually responsible for paying it. 187 Despite this testimony, 
Leonard prepared an amended complaint that perpetuated Rentz's breach of 
contract claims against Warfield and Jemesco, and Roach prepared a memo-
randum in opposition to Warfield's and Jemesco's summary judgment mo-
at 633-34); Comiskey, 989 F.2d at 1010 (citing Boogaerts v. Bank of Bradley, 961 F.2d 765, 
768 (8th Cir. 1992); Denton v. Mr. Swiss of Mo., Inc., 564 F.2d 236,240-42 (8th Cir. 1977)). 
179. See, e.g., In re Porto, 645 F.3d 1294, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2011) (reversing sanc-
tions against party and remanding case for further evaluation on the issue); Kasalo v. Harris 
& Harris, Ltd., 656 F.3d 557, 560-63 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing involuntary dismissal where 
sanction was predicated on "poor lawyering" by the plaintiff's counsel; all of the offending 
conduct was attributable to the lawyer and none to the plaintiff); Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel 
Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's determination 
that party should not be sanctioned jointly with counsel); Tenkku v. Normandy Bank, 348 
F.3d 737, 744 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that district court erred in sanctioning party as 
opposed to counsel under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Beeson v. Smith, 893 F.2d 930, 
932 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that case should not have been dismissed when counsel, not 
client, was the cause of the underlying problems); McCarty v. Verizon New Eng., Inc.; 731 
F. Supp. 2d 123, 135 (D. Mass. 2010) (declining to sanction party for pursuing frivolous 
litigation where there was "no reason to believe that he and not his attorneys was the puppet 
master of the ... litigation"). 
180. Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76 (Tex. App. 1994). 
181. 556 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2009). 
182. /d. at 391. 
183. /d. at 391-92. 
184. /d. at 391. 
185. /d. at 392. 
186. !d. at 391. 
187. /d. at393. 
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tion on all claims against them.188 Warfield and Jemesco moved for sanc-
tions against Rentz and his lawyers under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for 
litigating baseless claims. 189 The district court heard the sanctions motion in 
October 1999 and then astonishingly took nearly eight years to rule. 190 
When it finally decided the motion in August 2007, the district court im-
posed modest monetary sanctions on Leonard and Roach, but declined to 
sanction Rentz. 191 Warfield and Jemesco appealed several aspects of the 
district court's ruling to the Sixth Circuit, including the decision not to sanc-
tion Rentz. 192 
On appeal, Warfield and Jemesco argued that the district court abused 
its discretion in not sanctioning Rentz for violating Rule 11 in connection 
with his amended complaint and memorandum opposing summary judg-
ment because he "was actively involved in the litigation and allowed his 
attorneys to make allegations ... that he knew to be untrue."193 Rentz 
acknowledged his active participation in the litigation, but insisted he was 
always consistent and truthful when making factual assertions, and that as a 
layperson '"[h]e was not in a position to evaluate whether the allegations 
asserted in the two pleadings, now couched in ... legal parlance as distinct 
legal theories, were equivalent to the accounts he provided of those meet-
ings and events. "'194 The Sixth Circuit agreed with Rentz. 
The district court had declined to sanction Rentz because there was no 
evidence that he had misled his lawyers into making the allegations or ar-
guments they did, nor was there evidence that Rentz ever deceived defense 
counsel. 195 This, the Sixth Circuit concluded, was a proper exercise of dis-
cretion.196 Rentz's deposition testimony was accurate and truthful, albeit 
contrary to the claims Leonard and Roach asserted on his behalf against 
Warfield and Jemesco. 197 If the lawyers improperly characterized Warfield's 
statements as reported by Rentz as creating a "contract" or constituting a 
"promise," it was nonetheless reasonable for Rentz as a layperson to trust 
their professional judgment.198 Furthermore, the offending allegations were 
not purely factual; rather, they were mixed questions of law and fact for 
188. ld. at 394. 
189. !d. at 392-93. 
190. ld. at 394. 
191. !d. 
192. Id. at 391. 
193. ld. at 397-98. 
194. !d. at 398 (first alteration in original) (quoting Rentz's brief). 
195. !d. 
196. !d. at 398-99. 
197. ld. at 399. 
198. !d. But cf Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1118 (lith Cir. 2001) (indicating 
that it is proper to sanction a client under Rule 11 "when he misrepresents facts in the plead-
ings" or "when it is clear that [the client] is the 'mastermind' behind the frivolous case"), 
abrogated by Douglas Asphalt Co. v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146, 1151 (lith Cir. 2011). 
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which a layperson should not be held responsible. 199 Accordingly, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision not to sanction Rentz personal-
ly.2oo 
Rentz was correctly decided. It is common for clients to report facts to 
their lawyers and for the lawyers to thereafter formulate legal theories, pre-
pare pleadings, craft strategy, and plot tactics. Clients seldom dictate legal 
theories, the contents of pleadings, or strategy or tactics-what ethics rules 
characterize as the "means" of a representation.201 To the contrary, clients 
usually defer to their lawyers in these areas. 202 Many clients have no choice 
but to defer to their lawyers' decisions and judgments; they lack the educa-
tion, training, or experience to effectively monitor their lawyers' activi-
ties.203 Even sophisticated clients and those with legal training routinely 
defer to their lawyers' choices and judgments for a host of valid practical 
reasons. In any event, so long as the means of a representation are not cor-
rupted by a client's dishonesty or other misconduct, the client is not com-
plicit in the lawyer's use of wrongful means, or the client is not prodding 
the lawyer to achieve improper objectives, it is generally correct to confine 
any sanctions to the errant lawyer.204 Certainly, a court should never sanc-
tion a party for its lawyer's misconduct if it does not sanction the lawyer 
personally. 205 
B. The Rare Case When Vicarious Liability for Sanctions Is Appropriate 
Although courts generally should not sanction innocent parties for 
their lawyers' misconduct for the reasons explained previously, there are 
rare exceptions. For instance, there may be a case in which a lawyer's dere-
lictions are so obvious or recurring that the client is effectively on notice 
that its failure to replace the lawyer or to take other corrective measures will 
expose it to sanctions. 206 A client disregards such warning signals at his own 
peril.207 A party who is also a lawyer may be charged with her counsel's 
199. Rentz, 556 F.3d at 399. 
200. /d. 
201. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2012) (observing that 
"[c]lients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer[s] with respect to 
the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, 
legal and tactical matters"). 
202. !d. 
203. See Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 281 (Ill. 2004) (stating that 
most clients lack the ability to closely monitor their lawyers' activities). 
204. See Rentz, 556 F.3d at 399. 
205. See In re Porto, 645 F.3d 1294, 1306 (lith Cir. 2011). 
206. Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1522 (5th Cir. 1985). 
207. See id. (affirming dismissal of case as sanction following at least nine significant 
procedural defaults by lawyer). 
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neglect or misconduct.208 More common are cases in which a sanction will 
be meaningful only if it affects the party or where it is impossible for the 
court to remedy the lawyer's misconduct without penalizing the party the 
lawyer represents.209 This scenario is most likely to arise out of a lawyer's 
serious misconduct at trial. In cases of trial misconduct, sanctioning the 
lawyer exclusively is often insufficient to cure the prejudice to the opposing 
party and to the court caused by the lawyer's misconduct. The imposition of 
sanctions against a client for its lawyer's conduct at trial is consistent with 
the general rule that both lawyers and clients "are bound by [lawyers'] trial 
strategy ."210 
02 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co. 211 is 
a recent case in this category. 02 Micro sued the defendant, commonly re-
ferred to as BiTEK, for inducing the infringement of two 02 Micro patents 
on current inverter controllers used to light electronic displays in computers 
and smart phones.212 Prior to trial, 02 Micro moved in limine to prevent 
BiTEK from referring to 02 Micro's selection of the Cayman Islands as the 
location of its corporate headquarters.213 The court granted the motion in 
part; it held that BiTEK could refer to the fact that 02 Micro was a Cayman 
Islands corporation, but it further held that BiTEK could not offer evidence 
regarding the tax advantages obtained by 02 Micro through its foreign in-
corporation.214 The district court warned the lawyers for both sides to ap-
proach the bench before exploring a subject covered by the motion in 
limine.215 During voir dire, BiTEK's lawyer, without first approaching the 
bench, asked the jury panel, "'Now, are there any of you who have a prob-
lem with a company that puts its headquarters offshore on a Caribbean is-
land in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes?"'216 
02 Micro objected to the question and, after a side bar and a hearing, 
the district court found that BiTEK's lawyer had willfully violated the in 
limine order.217 Invoking its inherent power to sanction litigants and law-
yers, the district court held BiTEK's lawyer in contempt, declared a mistrial 
208. See, e.g., Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(reasoning that a lawyer-plaintiff was "clearly chargeable with his lawyer's neglect"). 
209. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 834 F.2d 166, 169-71 (lOth Cir. 1987) (affirm-
ing dismissal of case as a sanction where district court declined to reopen discovery and the 
plaintiff's lawyer then said that the plaintiff refused to proceed to trial on the scheduled date 
without further discovery). 
210. !d. at 171. 
211. 449 F. App'x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
212. !d. at 925. 
213. !d. 
214. !d. 
215. Jd.at926. 
216. !d. (quoting J.A. at 472). 
217. ld. 
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at 02 Micro's request, and reset the case for trial before a new jury.218 The 
court also imposed several other sanctions, including precluding BiTEK 
from presenting expert testimony on the issue of infringement.219 The case 
eventually proceeded as a bench trial after BiTEK dropped its state law 
counterclaims and 02 Micro opted to seek only injunctive relief.220 The dis-
trict court found that BiTEK had induced two companies to infringe 02 
Micro's patents and entered a permanent injunction for 02 Micro.221 BiTEK 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, with one of the points on appeal being the 
district court's preclusion of its expert witness's testimony on infringe-
ment.222 According to BiTEK, the district court imposed the "death penalty" 
when it barred BiTEK's expert from testifying there was no infringement.223 
This allegedly was an abuse of discretion because, among other things, it 
"punished BiTEK for its attorney's misconduct [for] which BiTEK was not 
culpable. "224 
The Federal Circuit disagreed. In reasoning that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in precluding BiTEK from presenting expert testi-
mony on infringement, the 02 Micro court noted that BiTEK was not chal-
lenging the district court's finding that its counsel knowingly violated the in 
limine order in bad faith. 225 Rather, BiTEK contended that the district court 
erred because it did not find bad faith by BiTEK itself.226 The Federal Cir-
cuit easily rejected that argument on the basis that the district court specifi-
cally found that BiTEK caused the mistrial through its counse/.227 Contrary 
to BiTEK's claim that the district court sanctioned it for misconduct that 
was solely attributable to its lawyer, "the finding that BiTEK was acting 
through its counsel comport[ ed] with the well-settled principle that a client 
is responsible for its attorney's conduct in the courtroom."228 
BiTEK fared no better on its related argument that the district court's 
preclusion of its expert's testimony on infringement effectively was a 
"death penalty sanction[]."229 To be sure, the exclusion of BiTEK's expert 
witness's intended testimony hampered its ability to present its non-
infringement theory, but that sanction was far short of dismissal given the 
218. /d. 
219. /d. 
220. /d. 
221. /d. at 927. 
222. /d. 
223. /d. at 929. 
224. /d. 
225. /d. at 930. 
226. /d. 
227. /d. 
228. /d. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)). 
229. See id. at 930-31. 
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other evidence at BiTEK's disposaJ.230 As the 02 Micro court explained, 
BiTEK still had the ability to defeat 02 Micro's infringement claims 
through documentary evidence and direct testimony by its technical fact 
witnesses, and by cross-examining 02 Micro's infringement expert.231 In 
addition, the exclusion ofBiTEK's expert was necessary to deter future trial 
misconduct by BiTEK's counsel and by other lawyers.232 
BiTEK complained that the other sanctions imposed by the district 
court-such as limiting its voir dire time, limiting its peremptory challeng-
es, requiring it to pay the costs and fees associated with the failed jury selec-
tion, and telling the jurors in the second trial that its reduced voir dire time 
was a punishment-were sufficient to compensate 02 Micro and deter fu-
ture misconduct.233 The court rejected this argument as well.234 The district 
court specifically found that monetary sanctions were insufficient in this 
context because they would basically allow a litigant to buy a new jury pan-
el by intentionally violating court orders.235 More broadly, the 02 Micro 
court declined to second-guess the district court's conclusions about the 
necessity of the sanctions it chose.236 In the end, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court's exclusion of BiTEK's expert witness's testimony as a 
sanction for its lawyer's misconduct during voir dire.237 It also affirmed the 
district court's entry of a permanent injunction against BiTEK.238 The sanc-
tions in 02 Micro were unquestionably stiff, and BiTEK understandably felt 
as though it was being penalized for conduct over which it had no control. 
Based on the facts in the opinion, BiTEK could not have anticipated its 
lawyer's blatant violation of the district court's in limine ruling and, in any 
event, the misconduct for which it was punished was uniquely within its 
lawyer's control. Unfortunately for BiTEK, during trial a client and lawyer 
essentially are one for tactical purposes, including responsibility for the 
consequences of tactical misjudgrnents.239 This is a practical requirement; 
sanctioning the lawyer alone is often insufficient to cure the prejudice to the 
opposing party and to the court attributable to the lawyer's misconduct in 
trial. 
230. /d. at 931. 
231. /d. 
232. /d. 
233. /d. at 926, 931. 
234. See id. at 931. 
235. /d. 
236. /d. 
237. /d. 
238. /d. at 934. 
239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26, cmt. b, d 
(2000) (outlining when a lawyer's act is considered to be that of a client in proceedings be-
fore a tribunal). 
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In this case, as in most cases of trial misconduct by lawyers, the dis-
trict court had to balance the parties' competing interests when weighing 
possible sanctions. It was reasonable in that balancing for the district court 
to conclude that 02 Micro's interests were superior to BiTEK's.240 It was 
also reasonable for the court to factor in its own interest in the orderly and 
efficient administration of cases on its docket when fashioning a remedy for 
the serious misconduct ofBiTEK's lawyer. In short, 02 Micro was a case in 
which the district court concluded either that it was impossible to remedy 
the lawyer's misconduct without penalizing the party the lawyer represented 
or that the party had to be penalized to make any sanction meaningful. It 
was therefore a proper exercise of discretion to strike BiTEK's expert as a 
sanction for its lawyer's misconduct and, more broadly, to take an equitable 
approach instead of applying independent contractor doctrine in doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts and others who seek to hold parties liable for their lawyers' 
misconduct have long invoked agency law as a basis for doing so. This is a 
superficially appealing approach; after all, the attorney-client relationship is 
plainly an agency relationship. Yet agency law is not a reliable basis for 
imputing a lawyer's misconduct to a client in the sanctions context. Vicari-
ous liability based on respondeat superior requires a master-servant rela-
tionship, but lawyers are not their clients' servants even though they are 
their agents. Rather, lawyers generally are independent contractors. Liability 
based on a lawyer's apparent authority is no answer for several reasons, the 
most fundamental being that a lawyer's apparent authority generally extends 
only to conduct that is legal and proper. In addition, sanctioning innocent 
clients for lawyers' misconduct is often unfair and is unlikely to remedy the 
misconduct or to deter misbehavior in the future. To be effective, sanctions 
should be personal to the offender. Courts should therefore depart from 
agency law when considering sanctions that may penalize a client for its 
lawyer's misconduct and instead rely on equitable principles in fashioning 
an appropriate penalty. 
In a nutshell, clients should be sanctioned for their lawyers' miscon-
duct in only two situations. The first is where the client is complicit in the 
lawyer's misconduct, as where the misconduct is the product of their coor-
dinated effort. The second is where a sanction will be meaningful only if it 
affects the client or if it is impossible to cure the lawyer's misconduct with-
out penalizing the client. Some courts now follow these courses, discarding 
240. See id. § 26 cmt. b (explaining that while it can sometimes be unfair to bind 
clients to the acts of their lawyers, a court may regard it as more appropriate for the conse-
quences of a lawyer's misconduct to be borne by the client rather than by an innocent third 
party). 
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imprecise and often inaccurate notions of agency law in the process. All 
courts should do so. 

